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DORSEY

v.

[38 C.2d

BARBA

[So F. No. 18369. In Bank. Feb. 4, 1952.]
,TOSEPIH~E

DORSEY et at, AppellJlnts,
BARBA et at, Respondents.

V.

VINCENT

(1] Automobiles-Persons Liable-Owner.-In the absence of com-

[2]

[3]

[4]

[6]

pliance with Veh. Code, §§ 178, 186, relating to endorsement
of certificate of ownership and to notice of transfer, a purported transfer of an automobile is ineffective to relieve an
owner of the liability imposed under Veh. Code, § 402, relating to liability for negligence of a person operating the
vehicle with the owner's express or implied permission.
Id.-Persons Liable-Owner.-A person may be liable as an
owner under Veh. Code, § 402, for negligence of another operating an automobile with his permission, even though he
does not have "all the incidents of ownership" as the term
"owner" is defined in Veh. Code, § 66, since the express mention of such exceptions as conditional vendors and chattel
mortgagees from the operation of § 402 indicates that the
framers thereof did not intend to incorporate the definition
of owner found in § 66.
.
Id.-Persons Liable-Wife.-A wife, who is the sole registered
owner of an automobile, is included in the term "every owner"
as used in Veh. Code, § 402, and where she is not within
any of the exceptions mentioned in such section she can avoid
liability for her husband's negligence in operating the car
only by showing that she did not actually consent or had
no power to cousent to his use of the car.
Id.-Persons Liable-Wife.-Where an automobile is registered
in the wife's name alone and she in fact consents to her
husband's use and operation of it, she cannot avoid liability
for her husband's negligence under Veh. Code, § 402, by claiming that she is without power· to give such consent and that
she has merely a community property interest in the car.
Id.-BegistratioD.-The requirements fol' registration of motor
vehicles (Veh. Code, § 140 et seq.) were "enacted in the interests of the public welfare, and one of the purposes for
the legislation is to afford identification of vehicles and persons responsible in eases of accident and injury.

[IJ See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp., Automobiles, § 302; Am.Jur.,
Automobiles, § 356.
Melt. Dig. References: [1,2J Automobiles, § 167(1); [3,4]
Automobiles, § 165; [5] Automobiles, § 20; [6,7,10] Jury, § 5;
[8J Damages, ~ 197: [9] .Jury, § 8: [11] Jury, § 8(4); [12,13] Damages, § 197; [14] New Trial, § 244.
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[6] Jury-Right to Jury Trial.--Const., art. I, § 7, guarantees the
right of a jury trial as it existed at common law when the
Constitution was adopted in 1849.
[7] Id.-Right to Jury Trial.-The constitutional guarantee of
l·ight to jury trial does not require adherence to the letter
of common law practice, and new procedures better suited
to the efficient administration of justice may be substituted
if there is no impairment of the substantial features of a
jury trial.
[8] Damages-Province of Court and Jury.-An essential element
of a jury trial is that issues of fact shall be decided by a
jury, including the assessment of damages, and any interference with the jury's function in this respect must be
examined with the utmost care.
[9] Jury-Right to Jury Trial-Denial of Right.-A court may
not increase an inadequate award in a case involving conte!ted damages without the consent of plaintiff; such act
constitutes a denial of his right to a jury trial in violation
of Const., art I, § 7.
[10] Id.-Right to Jury Trial.-It is not the mere form of a jury
trial to which one is entitled under the Constitution, but the
fundamental right to have a jury determination of a question
of fact.
[11] Id.-Right to Jury Trial-Denial of Right.-There has been
no denial of the right to a jury trial if a verdict is set aside
and motion for new trial granted.
[12] Damages-Province of Court and Jury.-The court may not,
in lieu of ordering a new trial following the verdict of a
jury, itself assess damages on conflicting or uncertain evidence
and modify the judgment with the assent of only one party;
nor can such procedure be justified as a proper exercise of
the court's authority to prescribe terms in granting or denying motions for new trials.
[13] Id.-Province of Court and Jury.-A court may not impose
conditions which impair the right of either party to a reassessment of damages by the jury where the first verdict
was inadequate, and defendant's waiver of his right to jury
trial by consenting to modification of the judgment cannot
be treated as binding on plaintiff.
[14] New Trial-Conditional Orders-Remission of Damages.A court has power to require reduction of a jury's award
over defendant's objection as a condition to denying his
[6] See Cal.Jur., Jury, § 3; Am.Jur., Jury, §4.
[9] Power of court to reduce or increase verdict without giving
party affected the option to submit to a new trial, notes, 58
A.L.R. 779; 95 A.L.R. 1163.
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motion for a new trial in cases where damages are uncertain and speculative.

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior' Court of Alameda County. Donald K. Quayle, Judge. Reversed.
Action for damages for personal injuries sustained in au
automobile accident. Judgment for defendant Catherine
Barba and against defendant Vincent Barba, reversed.
Theodore Golden, J. Bruce Fratis and Julius M. Keller
for Appellants.
James F. Galliano, C. Paul Paduck, Henry Teichert, Ger·
aId P. Martin, Clark & Heafey, Edwin A. Heafey, Augustin
Donovan and Louis B. De A vila for Respondents.
GIBSON, C. J.-This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiffs Dorsey and
Anderson in an automobile accident. They sought recovery
against Vincent Barba as operator, and Catherine Barba as
registered owner, of the car which collided with the one in
which they were riding. The jury returned verdicts against
Vincent but in favor of Catherine, and judgment was entered
accordingly. Thereafter, pursuant to a conditional order
made on plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, the court, with
Vincent's consent, modified the judgment against him by
increasing the amount of damages awarded. Plaintiffs, who
did not consent to the increase, have appealed from the modified judgment against Vincent and from the judgment in
favor of Catherine.
LIABILITY OF CATHERINE

The automobile, which was purchased with community
funds, was registered in Catherine's name alone, and she
testified that Vincent "had it put in my name so that I
would feel that half of it belonged to me and the other half
belonged to him." Defendants separated, and a property
settlement agreement was entered into by which Catherine
transferred "all of her right, title, and interest" in the car
to Vincent. The agreement was approved by an interlocutory
decree of divorce signed about three months prior to the accident. Before the separation Vincent drove the car to and
from work and used it whenever he desired, and it was in his
possession when the agreement was made. Tl1e car was never
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driven by Catherint', and she testified that she allowed Vincent
to keep it after the separation, that she "presumed he was
using it," and that she did not ask him to return it or tell him
he could not drive it. Catherine did not endorse the owner·
ship certificate until some months after the accident, and she
did not give the Department of Motor Vehlcles any notice
of the intended transfer as provided by statute. (See Veh.
Code, §§ 176, 177, 178, 186.)
[1] Section 402 of the Vehicle Code, as amended in 1943,
imputes to the owner of an automobile liability for the negli.
gence of a person operating the vehicle with the owner's
express or implied permission. In the absence of compliance
with Vehicle Code, sections 178 and 186, a purported transfer
of an automobile is ineffective to relieve an owner of the
liability imposed under section 402. (See Weinberg v. White·
bone, 87 Cal.App.2d 319 [196 P.2d 963] ; Stewart v. Norsigian,
64 Cal.App.2d 540 [149 P.2d 46, 150 P.2d 554] ; LepZatv.
Baley Wiles Auto Sales, 62 Cal.App.2d 628 [145 P.2d 350] ;
Bunch v. Kin,2 Cal.App.2d 81 [37 P.2d 744] ; see, also, Votaw
v. Farmers A. 1nter·1m. Exch., 15 Ca1.2d 24 t97 P.2d 958,
126 A.L.R. 538J.) Catherine does not dispute this rule but
contends that it is inapplicable to her because she had only
a community interest in the car and never was an owner within
the meaning of that section. She relies on section 66 of the
Vehicle Code, which defines an owner as "a person having
all the incidents of ownership," and argues that since the
exclusive management and control of community personal
property is given to the husband by section 172 of the Civil
Code, she did not have all of the rights of an owner in the car.
[2] It is clear, however, that a person may be liable as
an owner under section 402 \.lven though he does not have "all
the incidents of ownership. " That section provides that every
otoner of a motor vehicle is liable for imputed negligence
except conditional vendors, their assignees, and chattel mort·
gagees, when those persons are out of possession. The express
mention of these exceptions indicates that the framers of sec·
tion 402 did not intend to incorporate the definition of owner
found in section 66. If the intent had been to limit liability
to those having "all the incidents of ownership," it would
not have been necessary to expressly exempt conditional
vendors and chattel mortgagees, who, of course, do not possess
all the rights of ownership. [3] Catherine, as sole registered
38 C.2d-II
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ownrr of t11r automobilr, obviously is included in the term
"every owner," and since she is not within the exceptions she
can avoid liability only by showing she did......not actually
eonsent or had no power to consent to Vincent's use of the
car.
'l'here can be no question that at the time of the accident
Vincent was driving the car with Catherine's permission, but
she contends that any consent she may have given was ineffective because she lacked power to give her husband permission
to use the car since he had the right of management and control
under section 172 of the Civil Code. In support of her position Catherine relies upon Pacific Tel . ~ Tel. Co. v. Wellman,
98 Cal.App.2d 151 [219 P.2d 506], where the car involved in
the accident was registered in the names of both Mr. and Mrs.
WeUman. The court held that the car must be presumed to be
community property and that for the purposes of section 402
the negligence of Mr. Wellman in operating the car could not
be imputed to his wife because she lacked power to consent to
his use of it. (Cf. Cox v. Kaufman, 77 Cal.App.2d 449 [175
P.2d 260], where the husband was the sole registered owner.)
There is also language in Wilcox v. Berry, 32 Ca1.2d 189,
191-192 [195 P.2d 414], and Caccamo v. Swanston, 94 Cal.
App.2d 957, 963, 965 [212 P.2d 246], indicating that when a
car is registered in the names of both husband and wife, she
may show that she had only a community interest and therefore had no power to give her husband consent to operate the
car.
[4] The foregoing cases may be distinguished, however,
because none of them involved the situation here present
where the car was registered in the wife's name alone and
she in fact consented to her husband's use and operation of it.
Under these circumstances, the wife should not be permitted
to claim that she was without power to give such consent.
[5] The requirements for registration were enacted· in the
interests of public welfare, and one of the purposes for the
legislation is to afford identification of vehicles and persons
responsible in cases of accident and injury. (See Henry v.
General Forming, Ltd., 33Ca1.2d 223, 227 [200 P.2d 785].)
Where the registration shows the names of both husband and
wife, their identity is disclosed as contemplated by the statute,
and, if an accident occurs while the husband is driving, there
may be some justification for permitting the wife to explain
and amplify the record by showing the true status of her
ownership. On the other hand, where, as here, the registration
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is in the wife's name. alone with her. knowledge, .and she in
fact gives her husband implied or express permission to use the
car, the statutory purpose would be defeated if she were
permitted to contradict the record by showing that, instead of
being the sole owner, she had merely a community property
interest and no power to give permission. 1
It appears from the foregoing that the r(>cord establishes as a matter of law that Catherine was liable, to the
extent provided by section 402, for any injuries to plaintiffs
resulting from negligent operation of the car by Vincent.
Since the jury determined that plaintiffs' injuries were the
proximate result of Vincent's negligence, it could not properly
have found for Catherine, and the judgment in her favor
must therefore be reversed.
PROPRIETY OF ORDER INCREASING AWARDS

The verdicts against Vincent apparently made no allowance for damages for pain and disfigurement suffered by
plaintiffs since the amounts awarded were insufficient to cover
medical expenses and loss of earnings. Plaintiffs' motion
for new trial was denied on condition that Vincent consent
to a modification of the judgment increasing each award in an
amount fixed by the court. The figures arrived at exceeded
the special damages proved and apparently included some
compensation for pain and disfigurement. Vincent agreed to
the increases, but plaintiffs' assent was not required or given.
The primary question concerns the propriety of the court's
action in assessing damages without plaintiffs' consent.
Plaintiffs contend that the amounts fixed by the court are
inadequate and that, since the damages are contested and
uncertain, the act of the court in increasing the jury's award
without their consent constitutes a denial of their right to a
jury trial in violation of article I, section 7, of the California
Constitution which provides that the "right of trial by jury
shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate." [6] This section guarantees the right of jury trial as it existed at common
law when the Constitution was adopted in 1849. (People v.
Kelly, 203 Cal. 128, 133 [263 P. 226] ; People v. Martin, 188
Cal. 281, 285-286 l205 P. 121, 21 A.L.R. 1399]; Southern
'For eases establishing the right of an injured party to proceed agaiust
an owner other than the registered owner, see Ferroni v. Pacific Finance
Corp., 21 Cal.2d 773, 778 [135 P.2d 569]; Logan v. Serpa, 91 CIlI.App.2d
818, 822 f206 P.2d 70]; McCalla v. Grosse, 42 Cal.App.2d ;'46, 549-550
[109 P.2d 358].
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Pac. Land Co. v. Dickerson, 188 Cal. 113, 117·118 [204 P. 576] j
Cline v. Superior Cotlrt, 184 Cal. 331, 339 [193 P. 929] j
itlartin v. S·uperior Court. 176 Cal. 289, 292·294 [168 P. 135,
hR.A. 1918B 313] ; sl.'e Estate of Baillbri~ge, 169 Cal. 166,
167 [146 P. 427] ; Ingraham v. Weidler, 139 Cal. 588, 589·
590 [73 P. 415].) At that time, apparently, there was no
recognized common law practice allowing the court to increase
a jury's award in a case involving unliquidated damages.
(See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 476482 [55 S.Ct. 296,
297·299, 79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 1150] ; Mayne's Treatise on
Damages [2d ed., 1856] pp. 303-305, [9th ed. 1919] pp. 571,
580 j Sedgwick, Treatise on Damages [1847] pp. 19, 21, foot·
note p. 582, cf. [4th ed. 1868] pp.710-717.)
[7] The constitutional guarantee does not require adber·
ence to the letter of common law practice, and new proce·
dures better. suited to the efficient administration of justice
may be substituted if tbere is no impairment of the substantial features of a jury trial. (People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. .
470, 476 [268P. 909, 270 P. 1117].) [8] An essential ele- i
ment of sucb a trial, however, is that issues of fact shall be decided by a jury, and the assessment of damages is ordinarily
a question of fact. The jury as a fact-finding body occupies
so firm and important a place in our system of jurisprudence '
that any interference with its function in this respect must
be examined with the utmost care.
There is a conflict of authority as to the extent of a court's
power to increase the amount of an inadequate award over
plaintiffs' objection. Some .iurisdictions do not permit the
exercise of sucb a power. (Lemon v. Campbell, 136 Pa. Super.
370 [7 A.2d 643], citing BI'adwell v. Pittsburgh <t W. E. P.
R. Co. 139 Pa. 404 [20 A. 1046] ; see Watt v. Watt, L. R.
[1905], A.C. 115, 119-121.) Some allow it where damages
are liquidated or can be ascertained by a fixed standard.
(R1ldnick v. Jacobs, 9 W.W.Harr. (Del.) 169 [197 A. 381,
:)83, 384, discussing Massachusetts and Michigan decisions;
Kram~ Y. American Bakeries Co., 231 Ala. 278 [164 So. 565,
5701.) Other jurisdictions apparently allow the court to assess
increased damages as a condition to denying a new trial without regard to whether damages are liquidated or unliquidated.
(See }Iarkota v. Ea.d Ohio Gas Co., 154 Ohio 546 [97 N.E.
2d 13, 18-19] .)2 Tbe Wisconsin rule permits a court to in'Numerous cases contain broad statemt'nts recognizing the practice
but invoh'e procedural and factual situations distinguishable ffom the
one before us. Bee, for example, 8ecreto v. Carlander, 35 Cal.App.2d
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creasp an award over plaintiffs' objection if defendant consents to pay the largest amount which a jury could assess
under the proof. (See Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 [214
N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771].)
[9] The leading authority on the subject is Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 [55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R.
1150] which held that a federal court could not increase a
jury's award without the consent of both parties. The decision points out that the practice was not recognized generally at common law, and that an attempt by the court
to fix damages over plaintiff's objection constitutes a violation of the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution which provides that "the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law." State
. courts, of course, are not bound by the Seventh Amendment (Pea1's01l v. Yewdall, 95 U.S. 294, 296 [24 L.Ed. 436] ;
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92 [23 L.Ed. 678], and it
is true that there is some difference in language between that
amendment and the parallel provision of the California Constitution.s The reasoning of the Dimick case, however, is
applicable here since both the state and federal Constitutions adopted the existing rules of common law with regard to trial by jury, and the variation in language does not
warrant a different interpretation of the state Constitution.
361,364 [95 P.2d 476), Clausing v. Kershaw, 129 Wash. 67 [224 P. ;;73,
574], and Gaffney v. lllingsworth, 90 N.J.R. 490 [101 A. 243 at 243)
[defendant refuses to assent to increase and appeals from order granting
new trial, claiming court without power to make new trial order eon·
ditional]; Esposito v. Lazar, 2 N.J. 257 [66 A.2d 172, 173], [defendant appeals from order granting new trial on issue of damages alone,
claiming verdict indicated compromise--see, also, Elvin V. Public Ser1:ice Coordinated Transp., 4 N.J.Super. 491 [67 A.2d 889, 890];
Blackmore v. Brennan, 43 Cal.App.2d 280, 289 [110 P.2d 723] [defendant, appealing from modified judgment, waived right to jury trial by
consenting to increased award]; &da·mson v. CO·lmly of Los .d.ngeie&,
ii2 Cal.App. 125, 131 [198 P. 52) [collateral nttn<:k on modified final
judgment in condemnation proceeding in which county had consented
to inQreased award. Damages certain and computable.]
Minnesota and New Hampshire have noted the question of interference
with plaintiff's right to jury trial, hut have not pa8sed upon it. (Ol.~on
v. Chri~tiansen, 230 Minn. 1!18 [41 N.W.2d 248-249]; Hackett v.
Boston 4" M. R. R., 89 N.H. :;14 [6 A.2d 139, 140, 142).)
"A.rticle I, section 7, of the California Constitution provides merely
that the right of trial by jury "shall be secured to all and remain
inviolate," and it does not contain the further language that "no fact
tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined ••. than accordinr to
the rule! of the common law."
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It is g'('nera lIy r('('ogll iz('d that a COllrt may not increase an inH<ieqllate award in It ease involving contested and
unliquidated damages without the defendant's consent. (See
note 53 A.L.R. 783; 95 A.L.R. 1165; cf. discussion of the
Wisconsin practice in Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370 [214
N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771}.) It would seem to follow, logically, that the plaintiff's consent is also necessary. The assessment of damages by a court where they are speculative and
uncertain constitutes more than a technical invasion of the
plaintiff's right to a jury determination of the issue. Despite the fact that he has apparently benefited by the increase, the plaintiff has actually been injured if, under the
evidence, he could have obtained a still larger award from
a second jury. In the present case, for example, the evidence would sustain recovery for pain and disfigurement
well in excess of the amounts assessed by the court.
In support of the practice of denying a new trial over
the plaintiffs' objection on condition that defendant consent to pay an increased amount, it has been said that the
constitutional guarantee is satisfied when the plaintiff has
had one jury trial and that the court's exercise of its power
to grant or deny new trials will not be disturbed in the ab~
sence of an abuse of discretion. (See dissenting opinion
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. at 492-498, 55 8.Ct. at 303-305.)
[10] However, it is not the mere form of a jury trial to
which one is entitled under the Constitution, 'but the fundamental right to have a jury determination of a question of
fact. [11] It is, of course, clear that there has been no
denial of such' right if a verdict is set aside and motion for
new trial granted. (Estate of Bainbridge, 169 Cal. 166 (146
P. 427} ; Ingra.ham v. Weidler, 139 Cal. 588 [73 P. 415].)
[12] But it does not follow that, in lieu of ordering a new
trial, the court may itself assess damages on conflicting or
uncertain evidence and modify the judgment with the assent
of only one party. Neither can such procedure be justified
as a proper exercise of the court's authority to prescribe
terms in granting or denying motions for new trials. [13] A
court may not impose conditions which impair the right of
either party to a reassessment of damages by the jury where
the first verdict was inadequate, and the defendant's waiver
of his right to jury trial by consenting to modification of
the judgment cannot be treated as binding on the plaintiff.
[14] It is true that a court has power to require reduction of a jury's award over the defendant's objection as a
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condition to denying his motion for a new trial in cases
where damages are uncertain and speculative. (Draper v.
Hellman Commercial T. & S. Bank, 203 Cal. 26, 42-43 [263
P. 240] ; M07'ris v. Standard Oil Co., 192 Cal. 343 [219 P.
'""'998, 30 A.L.R. 1103] ; Zibbell v. SOttthern Pac. Co., 160 Cal.
237,254 [116 P. 513].) There is considerable doubt whether
this power was recognized at common law,· but, as stated
by this court in 1893, the practice is "too firmly established
in this state by a long line of decisions to be now questioned." (Davis v. Southern Pac. Co., 98 Cal. 13, 17, 18
[32 P. 646].) There may be no real distinction between
the powers to increase and decrease an award of damages,
but it does not follow that because the practice. of remitting
damages over the defendant's objection haS been approved
through what appears to have been a misconception of common law procedure, we must now allow the court to assess
increased damages over the plaintiff's objection, a practice
which has even less basis in the common law. Like the
United States Supreme Court. in the Dimick case, we are
reluctant to extend the precedent of the remittitur cases,
. by analogy or otherwise, to the present situation, since it
would result in impairment of the right to jury trial.
Arguments to the effect that courts should be permitted
to increase awards without the plaintiff's consent because
such procedure is more expeditious and would constitute
an improvement over established practice might be persuasive
if addressed to the people in support of a constitutional
amendment, but they are not appropriate here.
The judgment is reversed as to both defendants.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J:, Carter, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree that
the modified judgment should be reversed as to Vincent; I
would, however, affirm the judgment as to Catherine. She
lacked the power to for:fJid Vincent's use of the car and, ' .
hence, as a matter of law she could not in any legally ma- !
terial sense consent to his use of it. (See Krum v. Malloy
'It was apparently taken for granted in this st.ate. as it was in the
early federal eourts. that the practice was established at common law.
(See Dimick v. 8chiedt, 293 U.S. 474. 482·484 [55 S.Ct. 296, 299-300,
79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 1150]; Benedict v. CozzefUI (18.i4), 4 Cal. 381;
see, however, Payne v. Pacific Mail SteamRhi{' Co. (1850), 1 Cal. 33,
36·37 and George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 364-365.)
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(1943), 22 Cal.2d 132, 135 [137 P.2d 18] ; People v. Forbath
(1935),5 Cal.App.2d Supp. 767,769 [42 P.2d 108].)
.
TRAYNOR, J., concurring and dissenting.-For the reasons stated in the majority opinion, I agree that the judgment in favor of Catherine Barba should be reversed. I
dissent, however, from the holding that the courts of this
state do not have the power of additur.l
I
It is incongruous that plaintiffs should base their appeal
upon the ground that they have been denied a constitutional
right to jury trial. Although they had a jury trial, they
do not want a judgment entered on the jury verdict. They
attack that verdict and ask the court to rescue them from
it by granting a new trial before another jury. The right
to a jury trial, however, does not include the right to a
new trial.
Plaintiffs' erroneous reliance upon the constitutional guarantee' results from a failure to recognize the dual character
of the right to jury trial. Section 7 of article I of the California Constitution operates at the time of trial to require
submission of certain issues to the jury. Once a verdict'
has been returned, however, the effect of the constitutional
provision is to prohibit improper interference with the jury's
decision. This secondary effect of the constitutional right
is well illustrated by the reluctance of the English common
law judges to grant new trials in tort cases on the. grounds
of excessive or inadequate damages. At the time of the
American Revolution,2 the jury's determination of the amount
of damages in contract actions and in certain tort actions
1, I Additur," sometimes ealled "inereseitur," is used herein to describe
an order by which a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the ground of
inadequate damages is denied on the condition that the defendant eonsent
to a speeified inerease of the award. "Remittitur" is used to deseribp
an order by which a defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground
of excessive damages is denied on the condition that tIle plaintiff consent
to a specified reduction of thc award.
"With the inclusion of jury trial pro\'isiolls in the early state and
federal Constitutions (see 35 C.J. 147, t 12), the concept of jury trial
in this country became fixed and has not been affected by subsequent
changes in English law. It is this American concept of jury trial, based
on the English jury system of Revolutionary times, that was adopted
in California in 1849. (See Koppik'U8 V. State Capitol CommrB., 16 Cal.
248, 253, 254; People v. Hickman, 204 Cal. 470, 475 [268 P. 909, 270
P. 1117]; ct. Fletoher v. LOB Angeles Tf'. I" Sau. Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 184
[187P.425].)
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involving property was subject to judicial supervision through
the granting of nc\v trials; in tort actions involving interests
in personality, however, the courts rarely:i interfered with
the amount of the jury's verdict. (Wil/m'd v. Berkeley, 1
Burr. 669, 97 Eng.Rep. 472 [K.B. 1758] ; Sharpe v. Brice,
2 Bl.W.942, 96 Eng.Rep. 557 [C.P. 1774]; Beardmore v.
Carrington, 2 Wils.K.B. 244, 248, 95 Eng.Rep. 790, 792
[C.P. 1764] ; see Buller, J., on Nisi Prius [1785 ed.], p. 327;
Sedgwick on Damages [9th ed. 1913], pp. 688.689; Mayne ,
on Damages [11th ed. 1946), pp. 632·636; McCormick on .
Damages, pp. 26.27; Washington, Damages in Contract at
Common Lato, 47 L.Q.Rev. 345, 364.) Moreover, the judges
expressly recognized that the reason for their refusal to
grant new trials in such cases was the fact that the deter·
mination of the amount of damages was within the exclusive
province of the jury. Thus, in 1764, in a case involving
trespass and false imprisonment, the Court of Common Pleas
reviewed the earlier decisionS and, in a unanimous opinion,
said: "Weare now come to the case in 1 Stra. 691, Cham.
bers v. Robinson, which seems to be the only case where
ever a new trial was granted merely for the excessiveness .
of damages only: we are not satisfied with the reason given.
in that case, and think it of no weight, and want to know
the facts upon which the Court could pronounce the dam·
ages to be excessive. The principle on which it was granted, I
mentioned in Strange, was to give the defendant a chance •
of another jury: this is a very bad reason; for if it was ;
not, it would be a reason for a third and fourth trial, and
would be digging up the constitution by the roots; and there· !
fore we are free to say this case is not law ; and that there
is not one single case (that is law) in all the books to be I
found, where the Court has granted a new trial for excessive I
damages in actions for torts. . • . We desire to be under•.
stood that this Court does not say, or lay down any rule'
that there never can happen a case of such excessive dam·
agt's in tort where the Court may not grant a new trial; .
but in that case the damages must be monstrous and enor·
mous indeed, and such as all mankind must be ready to .

I

--rort easel of the 17th and early 18th eentu~8I in which new trials
were granted for exC!.essive damages appear to have involved also actual
miaeonduet of the jury. (See Wood v. GitutOtl, Style 466, 82 Eng.Rep.
867 [U.B. 1655); BOB v. Haw"keB, 1 Lev. 97, 83 Eng.Rer' 316 [K.B.
1663]; ..t,h v. ..t,h, Comb. 357, 90 Eng.Rep. 526 [K.B. 1697 ; Beardmore
v. CGfTi"gtOtl, 2 Wils.K.B. 244, 249, 95 EnIf.BeP. 790, 793 C.P. 1764].)
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l'xclaim against, at first blush." (Beardmore v. Carrington,
------:r\Vils.K.B. 244, 249, 95 Eng.Rep. 790, 793.) 4
Unwillingness to interfere with the jury's decision was likewise a controlling consideration in the first California case ,
to discuss the constitutional function of the jury with re- I
spect to the assessment of damages. In Payne v. Pacific Mail
S. S. Co., 1 Cal. 33, a tort action decided in 1850, the evidence on the issue of damages was conflicting, and the jury
returned a verdict for $1,000. The trial court ordered a
new trial unless the plaintiff consented to a remittitur of
$400, but the plaintiff refused and appealed from the order
granting a new trial. In unanimously reversing the action
of the trial judge, this court said: "Courts with great reluctance ever interfere with the finding of a jury in an action
for unliquidated damages for reason that the damages are !
excessive, and a court ought never to set aside a verdict
for such a cause, unless, beyond doubt, the verdict be unjust and oppressive, obtained through some undue advantage,
mistake, or in violation of law, as upon questions so peculiarly pertaining to the powers and investigation of the
jury, it ought to be presumed that the verdict of the jury
is correct. . . . The right of trial by jury in civil as well
as criminal cases, being secured by the Bill of Rights, and
believing as we do, that it is the duty of this court to remove every obstacle in the way of a free exercise of its right,
and that it should not be interfered with on the part of
the courts, except for the reasons above alluded to, and that
in the end, however just it may have appeared to the court
below to set aside this verdict, great abuse, if not the destruction of this right, would ensue, we are of the opinion
that the order of the court of First Instance, granting a new
trial, should be reversed." ( 1 Cal. 33, 36-37.)
The following year, the Payne case was expressly approved
in George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365, which was decided under
circumstances even more directly analogous to the present
'After the American Revolution, dicta continued to appear to the
effect that new trials for excessive damages would be granted in casel
of torts against the person under appropriate circumstances; by the
end of the 18th century the Court of King's Bench had acted upon this
doctrine. (Jones v. Sparrow, 5 T.R. 257, 101 Eng.Rep. 144 [K.B. 1793];
cf. Duberly v. Gunning, 4 T.R. 651, 100 Eng.Rep. 1226 [K.B. 1792].)
Until the middle of the 19th century, however, the English courts refused to grant new trials in such cases on the ground of inadequate
damages. (See Phillips v. London 4' 8. W. By., 5 Q.B.D. 78 [1879];
Manton v. Bales, 1 C.B. 444. 135 Eng.Rep. 613 [1845]; 0/. .4rmytage v.
HaltJy, 4 Q.B. 917, 918, 114 Eng.Rep. 1143, 1143 [1843].)
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appeal. The-plaintiff was awarded $1,000 by the jury, but
the trial court ordered a new trial unless the plaintiff should
consent to a remission of $500. This time the plaintiff
consented, and the defendants appealed. In affirming the
judgment, the court said: "It can scarcely be just ground
of complaint on the part of appellants that the judgment
of the court stands for but one-half the amount, for which
the verdict of the jury was rendered. The respondent, if
he had not acquiesced in the action of the court below by .
filing his remittitur, might, with more reason, have sought
the intervention of this court to sustain the finding of the
jury. . . . " (1 Cal. 363, 365.)
These early English and California cases show clearly
that when the constitutional right to jury trial was established it was regarded as a protection to parties relying upon
a verdict. Not until today has this court undertaken to
extend that protection to parties who attack a verdict. It
is true that new trials because of excessive or inadequate
damages are more frequently granted now than a century
ago (el.Holmes, The Common Law, pp. 122-129), but it
is also true that this modern practice constitutes a limitation upon the former powers of the jury. Whatever may
be the basis of a party's right to a new trial on the ground
of inadequate damages, it is obvious that such relief is granted
in spite of, rather than because of, the constitutional right
of trial by jury.
!

IT
In an attempt to overcome the fact that plaintiffs have
already had their jury trial, it is contended that there has
been thus far only a formal compliance with the constitutional requirement; it is said that plaintiffs have yet to be
accorded the substance of the right to jury trial-"the fundamental right to have a jury determination of a question
Unquestionably, the praetical effect· of additur
of fact."
is to give plaintiffs a judgment based, as to amount, upon
a finding made by the trial judge. Moreover, the mere fact
that plaintiffs have benefited from the disagreement between
judge and jury is not of itself a sufficient answer to the claim
that the judge had no authority to make such a finding.
Under appropriate circumstances, judges constitutionally
may, and constantly do, determine fact issues. The broad
scope of this fact-finding activity refutes the contention that
the framers of the Constitution regarded the jury as the
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exclusive fact tribunal. Thus, in a common law action
tried before a jury, the trial judge makes innumerable fact
decisions in admitting and excluding eviderice, in determining the court's jurisdiction, in passing on pleadings, and in
interpreting documents. (Fairbank v. Hughson, 58 Cal. 314,
315; Vallejo & Northern R. 00. v. Reed Orchard 00., 169 Cal.
545, 575 [147 P. 238] ; United States v. Ootter, 60 F.2d 689,
691; People v. Hillman, 246 N.Y. 467, 472-474 [159 N.E.
400] ; State v. White, 70 Vt. 225, 228 [39 A. 1085]; Durr ,
v. State, 175 Miss. 797, 808 [168 So. 65] ; see 9 Wigmore on
Evidence, [3d ed.], pp. 499-530, §§ 2549-2559; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 185,202,203,249.) These
decisions may even involve the same fact issues that, for
other purposes, are placed before the jury and may be of
equal importance to the outcome of the case. (See, for example, Peat's Case, 2 Lewin 288, 168 Eng.Rep. 1157, and
note.) Moreover, in equity, admiralty, probate, divorce, bankruptcy, and an ever-growing number of administrative cases,
there is no constitutional right to a jury at all-fact questions may constitutionally be decided by the judge or administrative body alone.
It is apparent that these many instances of judicial factfinding cannot be reconciled with what plaintiffs claim is the
underlying principle of jury trial. In reality the explanation of the right to jury trial is neither logical nor theoretical-it is historical. II The jury system developed in England over a period of centuries, and during that development many fundamental changes took place; at no time was
the system wholly consistent within itself. The framers of
the Constitution wisely refrained from attempting to rationalize into a single principle the conflicting rules relating to
juries. Their object was not to perfect the jury system but
to perpetuate it, and the right they established was therefore a limited one-the right to have a jury trial of certain questions of fact under certain circumstances. Expan"It is sometimes said that the constitutional guarantee was intended
primarily to limit the power of judges. This view of the jury system
as essentially a protection against judicial officials does not conflict with
additur. The jury by its verdict has already provided the contemplated
protection. So fnr as the present plaintiffs are concerned, the limits
fixed by the jury have not been violated, for the judge has awarded
plaintiffs more than did the jury. Any objection that the judge has
gone beyond the verdict in the other direction is removed by defendant's
consent.
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sion and impro\'emellt were left to statute and to constitutioual alllendment. 6
In deciding the issue of constitutionality, therefore, we must
be governed by an historical standard. At the time of the
American Revolution, would plaintiffs have had the right to
a reassessment of dti.mages by a second jury, They would
have had no such right simply because, as has been seen, the
first jury's determination of the amount of damages was
c.onclusive. The reexamination of the damages issue following an inadequate verdict in cases of torts against the person is a modern development unknown to the common law.
Moreover, there is every reason to believe that the English
judges of the late 18th century would have utilized the additur device, had they been willing to give plaintiffs' motion
any consideration at all.
It must be borne in mind that plaintiffs are in this court
on an appeal from the trial court's ruling on their motion
for a new trial on the ground of the insufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict. Two of the well-established
priuciples governing the disposition of such motions are of
particular importance.
1. The granting of new trials on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence is discretionary with the court. T
Such new trials developed in the 17th century after punishment of jurors and the harsh remedy of attaint had fallen
into disuse. (1 Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3d ed.
p. 225; Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, pp. 169,
172.) Equity had undertaken to relieve against unjust verdicts, and, in seeking to protect their jurisdiction from the
encroachment of the chancellor, the common law courts themselves began to set aside verdicts that were inequitable.
(Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390, 394-395, 97 Eng.Rep. 365,
-This responsibility has nut been ignored. For example: the require·
ment of a unanimous verdiet bas been remOl'ed in eivil eases (Cal.
Const., art. I, § j); the broad prineiples of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibit exclusion of Negroes from jury serviee (see NeGl v. DeZGwGre,
103 U.S. 370, 38.1 [26 L.Ed. 567.1; CtJ88eLZ V. XeIUI8, 339 U.S. 282 [70
S.Ot. 629,94 L.Ed. 839]; ct. BGllGrd v. United 8tGt1l8, 329 U.S. 187, 193
[67 S.Ot. 261, 91 L.Ed. 181] [women as jurors]; 157 A.L.R. 461): the
right to jury trial has been extended to probate matters by statute.
(Prob. Code, .371.)
'The court'll discretion is more limited, of eourse, when a new trial
ia $Ought on the ground of legal error eommitted by the trial judge.
The eonstitutional guarantee may well inelude the right to a jury that
bas not been misled by irregularities during the trial or by incorrect
instruetions on the law.

)

366

DORSEY 1:. BARBA

[38 C.2d

867; r; Holdsworth, History of English Law, 3d ed. p. 301;
Washington. Dmnugl's in Contmct at Cominon Law, 47 L.Q.
Rev. 345. 358.) There never developed an absolute right to a
new trial; instead the considerations that govern the court's
discretion have always been equitable in nature. Thus, a
textbook published at the end of the colonial period states:
"As the granting of a new trial is absolutely in the Breast
of the Court, they will often govern their discretion by col- .
lateral matters; and therefore will not grant a new trial in I
hard actions, such. as case for negligently keeping his nre;
nor where the equity of the cause is on the other side."
(Buller, J., on Nisi Prius [1785 ed.], p. 326. See, also,
3 Bl.Com. 392 [Jones ed. p. 2004] ; Wt'Zkinson v. Payne, 4 T.R.
468, 100 Eng.Rep. 1123 [K.B. 1791]; and cases collected in r
2 Salk. 644-653, 91 Eng.Rep. 543-556.) Judicial discretion in
ruling on new trial motions has continued to this day. It is
well settled in California that the trial court's decision on such
a motion will not be reversed on appeal in the absence of
a showing of an abuse of discretion. (WiUiams v. Field
Transp. Co., 28 Cal.2d 696, 698 [171 P.2d 722] ; Mosekian v.
Ginsberg, 122 Cal.App. 774, 780 [10 P.2d 525].) Even the
statute that specifies the grounds for a new trial states only
that it "may" be granted if one of those grounds is shown
to exist. (Code Civ. Proc.§ 657.)
By their motion for new trial, therefore, plaintiffs in effect appealed to the conscience of the court. They cannot
complain that the court, viewing all the equities of the case,
has selected a more expeditious and less costly method of
remedying the alleged injustice of the verdict. The trial
judge's solution is reasonable and equitable-plaintiffs are
entitled to no more.
2. New trial orders are frequently conditional. At common law a typical condition was that the moving party pay
the costs of the first trial. (Brigkt v. Eynon, 1 Burr. 390,
97 Eng.Rep. 365; see, also, R'ice v. Gaskirie, 13 Cal. 53, 54.)
According to Blackstone, the moving party might even be
required to consent to a change in the rules of evidence at
the second trial. (3 Bl.Com. 392 [Jones ed. p. 2005].) New
trials have also been conditioned upon payment of the opposing party's counsel fees (see Brooks v. Sa'1/. Francisco ct N. P.
R. Co., 110 Cal. 173, 174 [42 P. 570]) and upon consenting to
go to trial at a particular term of court. (NeZsO'l/. v. DSl1MY,
lQ2 F.2d 487, 491.) Similariy, new trials have been refused
on condition that the opposing party remit excess damages
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(Hughes v. H carst Publications Inc., 79 Cal.App.2d 703,
704 [180 P.2d 419]) and even on condition that certain land
awarded by the verdict be excluded from the judgment.
(Fry v. Stowers, 98 Va. 417, 421-423 [46 S.E. 482] ; see, also,
Gillespie v. Jones, 47 Cal. 259, 264; Eaton v. Jones, 107 Cal.
487, 491 [40 P. 798 J.) There is no impropriety, therefore,
in the conditional nature of the new trial order now under
review. If new trials can be granted on condition that a
certain amount be paid by one party to another, why may
they not be denied on the same condition' In each situation the court exeN:.ises a sound discretion in the interests
of an equitable solution of the case.
There are dicta in some of the common law cases to the
effect that the verdict of a jury can be reexamined only by
a second jury. (See, for example, Bright v. Eynon, 1 Burr.
390, 393, 97 Eng.R€p. 365, 366 [K.B. 1757].)8 It is clear,
however, that in making such statements the judges had in
. mind only the liability issue. On that issue there are but
two possible verdicts, and the court can change the jury's
decision only by making a directly contrary finding. Invariably the party relying on the verdict would oppose such
a change, and to protect that party it was held that any
reexamination of the liability issue must be before another
jury. An entirely different situation is presented, however,
by a motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive or
inadequate damages--a situation not considered by the common law judges. In such a case the court is not limited
to a complete reversal of the jury's determination and may
decide to make only a modification. The party relying on
the verdict may prefer that modification to the expense and
delay of a new trial; his consent removes the necessity for
a second jury.
III
Although few courts have ruled directly on additur, remittitur has been accepted in almost all states where the
question has arisen. (See 53 A.L.R. 783-792; 95 A.L.R. 11661168.) Remittitur has been allowed in California for over
100 years. (George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365; Hughes v. Hearst
Publications, Inc., 79 Cal.App.2d 703, 704 [180 P.2d 419].)
The majority opinion concedes that "There may be no real
"Justice Story made a similar statement in United State. v. Wonson,
1 Gall. 5 [28 Fed.Cas. 745, 750), but he approved remittitur in Blunt
v. Little, 3 l\Ia8on 102 [3 Fed.Cas. 760).
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distinction" behveen additur and remittitur but finds justification for remittitur in the fact that prior decisions have
approved it-"through what appears to have been a misconception of common law. procedure." I am not opposed
to the continuation of remittitur, for I believe it to be constitutional. I do oppose, however, the argument that, although remittitur and additur are identical in legal principle. the former may be held valid and the latter invalid.
The decisions approving remittitur are controlling in any
fact situation that is not materially different, and they are
therefore controlling here. The first victim of an automobile accident to sue for damages was not turned out of court
merely because the closest precedents involved horse-drawn
carriages.
To hold remittitur constitutional and additur unconstitutional is not only illogical-it is unfair. In the present case
plaintiffs are being given a new trial as a matter of right,
and yet, if the second jury allows excessive damages, the
trial judge, with plaintiffs' consent, can select a lesser amount
and require defendant to pay it. I doubt whether such a
procedure accords a defendant the equal protection of the
laws.
There is nothing unusual in the fact that early cases permitting remittitur are to be found whereas additur precedents
are both few and recent. Courts undertook to grant new
trials for excessive damages many years before similar action
was taken on the ground of inadequacy. (See McCormick on
Damages, pp. 72-73 ; Washington, Damage, in Oontract at
Oommon Law, 47 L.Q.Rev. 345, 365, n. 7; 46 C.J. 207-213,
§§ 152-154.)9 The issue of additur, therefore, was not presented until modern times. Nevertheless, additur is an equally
logical step in the growth of the law relating to unliquidated
damages.JO When the party rel~ing on a verdict consents'
to a modification by the court, whether that modification be
a reduction or an increase, the necessary constitutional protection has been provided.
~ew triala based on inadequacy are still prohibited by statute in
some states. (See 66 C.J.S. 258, ~ 77d.)
1. A similar development has been the practice of limiting new trials
to the damages issue in appropriate cases. The contention that thil
procedure is unconstitutional (because it was unknown to the common
law and results in presenting to the second jury an incomplete version
of the case) has been rejected. (GGlO".' Product, Co. v. C1uJmpUft
Befift'ft,Co., 283 U.S. 494, 497-499 [51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188J.)
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Tn my opinion, therefore, it was not a misconception of
common law procedure that prompted Justice Story to allow
remittitur in 1822. (Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102 [3 Fed.Cas.
760].) His decision and the unanimous decision of this court
in 1851 (George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365) show that at the
time our Constitution was adopted remittitur was not rt'garded
as a violation of the right to jury trial. I do not believe
that these early judges were unaware of the purposes of the
Bill of Rights and the common law principles governing the
granting of new trials.
The remittitur cases attest not only the constitutionality
of additur but its practical value as well. Remittitur became
an established rule of the law of damages as soon as the
practice of setting aside excerive verdicts became general. l1
It has been utilized in innumerable cases to avoid, for both
the parties and the courts, the expense and delay of repetitious
litigation. In the field of inadequate verdicts, additur can be
of similar value.
IV
The majority opinion relies upon Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
·U.S. 474 [55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603, 95 A.L.R. 1150], in
which the United States Supreme Court held that additur
"iolates the fedt'ral Constitution. That decision is not controlling here, for the Seventh Amendment is not binding upon
the California conrts. Moreover, there are pprsnasivp arllUments for rejecting the reasoning upon which the Dimick
case rests.
"Once the opposition to new trials for excessive damages in eases ot
torts against the person had been overcome, the Engli8h courts utilized
remittitur until tbe dceision of the House of Lords in Watt v. Watt,
r1905J A.C. 115. (See Belt v. Lawes, 12 Q.B.D. 356, 358; Htirry v.
Watson, Tr. 27 G. 3, C.B., 4. T.R. 659, 100 Eng.Rep. 1230.) In tbiil
country remittitur is npproximately as old as new trials for excessive
damages; thus, ill ordering a remittitur in 1822 (Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason
] 02 r3 Fccl.Cas. 7601), .1 ustice Story observed that such new trials
had only rceently become recognized, and even for tbat statement he
relied exclusively U(Jon dicta in English eases in wbieh new trials hnd
actually been denied. In California remittitur was approved in 18.i]
(George v. Law, 1 Cal. 363, 365), only a year after this court bad
reversed the granting of 1\ ne',. trial for excessive damages. (Payne v.
Pacific Mail 8. 8. Co., 1 Cal. 33, 37.) Although medieval cases involving
jury attaint are not dircetly in point, since the principles underlying
attaints differed from those governing new trials, it is nevertheless
significant that an attnint for excessive damages was barred if plaintiff
remitted the excess. (Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law,
47 L.Q.Rev. 34;), 34!l. citing: Y.B. P Hen. VI, f.2, pI. 5 /"1431J; Y.B.
12 Edw. IV, f.;), pI. 13 [1473J; Y.B. 13 Edw. IV, f.l, pI. 3 [1474].)
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The Seventh Amendment provides: "In suits at common
law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
common law." The first part of the amendment is similar
to section 7 of article I of the California Constitution, which
reads: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all,
and remain inviolate." As is pointed out in the majority
opinion, the effect of this language is to guarantee the substance of the right to trial by jury as it existed at common
law. The second part of the Seventh Amendment, however,
is entirely different in spirit and effect, and carries the federal
Constitution beyond the substance of the common law right.
Thus, in 1830, the United States Supreme Court declared
that the second clause was "substantial and independent" of
the first. (Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. (U.S.) 433, 447 [78
L.Ed. 732].) In view of this early interpretation, it is significant that neither the Constitution of 1849 nor the present
California Constitution adopted the second part of the federal
guarantee.
The restrictive character of the Seventh Amendment language has more than once led the federal courts to follow
anomalous rules in dealing with judicial supervision of juries.
Thus, it has been held that a federal judge, sitting in a jury
case, could direct a verdict when the evidence as a matter
of law was conclusive, but could not enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict after he had erroneously failed to
direct the verdict and the jury had erroneously found for
the opposing party. (SlOC1tm v. New York Life Ins. 00., 228
U.S. 364, 399 [33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879].) The reason for
this distinction was that, after a verdict has been returned.
a federal court is limited by the second clause of the Seventh
Amendment to the formal procedure of the common law.
Since the California Constitution guarantees only the substance of jury trial, judgment notwithstanding the verdict
is available in this state in cases where directed verdicts are
proper. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629; Estate of Baird, 198 Cal.
490, 506 [246 P. 324].)
It is apparent that in the Dimick case the problem of
constitutional construction facing the United States Supreme
Court was materially different from that presented here.
(See 44 Yale L.Jour. 318. 324-325.) The court concluded that
additur involves a reexamination of the damages issue after
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the jury has tried that question, and, since no common law
precedent for the practice was found, it was held to be a
prohibited innovation. The long-standing practice of remittitur
in the federal courts was justified on the ground of a century
of acceptance under the Constitution.
Even under the narrow language of the Seventh Amendment, the United States Supreme Court had great difficulty
in reaching the conclusion that additur is unconstitutional.
The decision in the Dimick case was by a bare majority of
five Justices, and Justice Stone, with whom Chief Justice
Hughes and Justices Brandeis and Cardozo concurred, filed
a well-reasoned dissenting opinion. The dissent emphasizes
the broad discretion of the common law judges in ruling on
new trial motions, the essential identity of additur and remittitur, the dangers of too rigid a construction of constitutional provisions, and "the generally recognized advantages
of the practice as a means of securing substantial justice
and bringing the litigation to a more speedy and economical
conclusion than would be possible by a new trial to a
jury . . . . " (293 U.S. 474, 490 [55 S.Ct. 296, 79 L.Ed. 603,
95 A.L.R. 1150].)

{So F. No. 18226. In Bank. Feb. 5, 1952.]
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[1] Venue-Actions Ex Contractu-Place of Performance.-Civ.
Code, § 1489, declaring that in absence of express provision
to contrary an offer of performance may be made at the option
of the debtor wherever the person to whom the offer ought to
be made can be found, does not have the effect ofa "special
contract in writing" within the .meaning of Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 395, stating that the county in which a contractual obligation
is incurred shall be deemed to be the county in which it is to
be performed unless there is a special contract in writing to
the contrary.
[2] Id. - Actions Ex Contractu - Plac~ of Performance.-While
Civ. Code, § 1489, relating to offer of performance, may be
an implied provision of an agreement appointing plaintiff
defendant's representative in a certain area on a commission
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